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Japan’s economic policy stands at a crossroads as Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi takes office, with the legacy of Abenomics challenged by shifting market and political realities.
The yen has halved against the dollar since 2012, superlong Japanese Government Bond (JGB) yields are at record highs, and demographic changes have reshaped demand for government bonds, setting the stage for a global debate on whether Japan’s new leadership can adapt its economic strategy to meet current challenges without causing instability at home or abroad.
In Episodio 77 of The Flip Side podcast, Global Head of Research Brad Rogoff and Head of Japan FX & Rates Strategy Shinichiro Kadota analyse the credibility of Japan’s fiscal ambitions, the fragility of JGB supply-demand, and consider the impact of persistent inflation on the Bank of Japan’s rate path.
Brad Rogoff:
Welcome to The Flip Side. I'm Brad Rogoff,
global head of research. And joining me
today from Tokyo is Shinichiro Kadota, our
head of Japan FX and rates strategy. Shin,
it's great to have you on.Welcome to The
Flip Side. I'm Brad Rogoff, global head of
research. And joining me today from Tokyo is
Shinichiro Kadota, our head of Japan FX and
rates strategy. Shin, it's great to have you
on.
Shinichiro Kadota:
Thanks for having me, Brad, and glad we
found a time that works for folks Tokyo and
New York.
Brad Rogoff:
Well, look, I feel like we had to because,
well, it's always relevant what's going on
in Japan to global markets, especially
global fixed income markets. When I look at
the 77-episode arc so far of The Flip Side,
right now is probably the most relevant time
in terms of being able to actually have a
real debate on something that's going on in
the country, considering the pivotal moment
we're in following the recent elections.
So what I want to examine today is how Japan can balance the legacy of Abenomics against mounting global pressures. New PM Takaichi is a strong follower of Abenomics like high pressure economy with inherent bias for proactive fiscal and close BOJ government coordination. In her victory speech after the Liberal Democratic Party, or the LDP as it's known, presidential election, she argued that Japan has not fully escaped deflation yet and even touched on potentially reviewing the BOJ government accord. To me, that sounds like a full-on doubling down on Abenomics.
Shinichiro Kadota:
So while I agree that the PM Takaichi's
inherent bias is for doubling down on
Abenomics, both the market and the political
environment that PM Takaichi faces today is
vastly different from what late PM Abe faced
in 2012. So today, the yen's half the value
against the dollar. Since then, Japan's
general public didn't like it, and the US
administration has also noticed it. And
additionally, super long JGB yields have
reached highest levels in history. And
politically, former PM Aso was the kingmaker
of PM Takaichi in the latest LDP election,
who became the vice president of the LDP.
And also, his brother-in-law, former Finance
Minister Suzuki became secretary general of
the LDP.
With the text from these fiscally disciplined senior leaders, I think PM Takaichi is unlikely to pursue reckless fiscal policy, and these market and political pressures are forcing policy adjustments that diverge from classic Abenomics. And that is why I think that you will see a redefinition of Abenomics in a much less extreme manner.
Brad Rogoff:
Well, thank you. Now we got the whole family
tree there, it sounds like. But let's just
start with talking about how big the stakes
are and how immediate the consequences can
be. So if fiscal intent outpaces market
tolerance, then consumers will have to pay a
credibility tax, usually that occurs through
FX, inflation and the long end. So if
policies underdeliver though, then
confidence erodes anyways.
Shinichiro Kadota:
Yep. So you mentioned the consequences. And
I agree with the tape on this one. So the
early reaction was equities higher, JGB long
yields higher and the yen weaker. Some of it
faded as investors realized pulling together
a big package fast is hard. The rhetoric is
now somewhat of a smaller, bit slower and
more conditional one. That's the real
definition.
Brad Rogoff:
Let's talk about fiscal here. So during the
LDP presidential election, Takaichi
campaigned on targeted tax relief, local
government support and investment and did
not deny the possibility of increasing
deficit funding JGB issuance, unlike what
the other candidates actually did. After
forming a coalition with JIP, she agreed to
consider lowering food consumption tax and
subsidizing high school education as a
minority government. And with Takaichi's
inherent bias, isn't the path of least
resistance more expansionary fiscal policy,
which can reverse the tape you're talking
about?
Shinichiro Kadota:
So, yes, I agree that the fiscal policy will
be more expansionary under Takaichi than say
her other opponents, such as Koizumi. And
indeed, the market heard the expansion and
moved reflexively. However, she faces the
market and political constraint, as I
mentioned earlier, and her argument for
responsibly active fiscal policy and calling
for lower net government debt to GDP ratio
is a bit different. And we estimated that
the initial policy proposals would export
about 15 basis point upward pressure on
30-year JGB term premium.
We also estimated that the further super long JGB issuance could reduce the term premium by ten basis points, leaving the net impact to a mere five basis points. So in practice, I think that means conditional stimulus and the calibrated rollout, not the early Abenomics type of bazooka, which drove the sharp market reaction, like Dall-E[?] and going from 80 to 100 in just six months of his election victory.
Brad Rogoff:
So yeah, I agree. Five basis points of
upward term premium not the end of the
world, but that upward pressure that you're
referring to on term premium here is policy
related. Right. But isn't there also a
structural lack of demand in super long
JGBs, and how does that fit with your
argument for this relative stability you're
mentioning?
Shinichiro Kadota:
Yeah. So the demand factor is definitely
something we have been focused on quite a
bit recently. And due to the demographics
and the regulatory backdrop, life insurance
who were the main buyers of the super long
JGBs for a long time have basically stopped
buying in the recent years. And that is
unlikely to change the amount of you. And
now the main buyer of the super long JGBs
have basically shifted to pension funds,
which is doing it for the rebalancing
purposes due to the strong equity
performance.
And the other key buyer is foreign investors. And but neither of them are really stable source of demand for JGBs. And that is why the JGB issuance cuts are in the focus. The Ministry of Finance have already cut the issuance by about ¥4 trillion in the summer. And additional cuts could help restore the balance in the supply and demand. So I think that in turn, could stabilize JGB term premia in at least in the near term.
Brad Rogoff:
Okay. So that's the demand side. But going
back to fiscal policy, even a smaller
package can certainly matter, especially
with coordinated BOJ messaging. In fact,
Takaichi is calling for more fiscal policy
beyond just next year, including refundable
tax credits, food consumption taxes, as well
as further increases in defense spending.
Shinichiro Kadota:
Agreed. But they will only go through with
the if credibility holds. And the catch is
credibility is mark to market every day and
FX and yield curve as there is always a risk
of inviting oversized market reaction that
will ultimately tie her hands, as was the
case for the UK in 2022. And Japan is much
more similar to UK than meets the eye.
Brad Rogoff:
How is that so, Shin? Because that's not
completely obvious to me.
Shinichiro Kadota:
So although Japan differs from UK in lacking
super long leveraged by pensions and having
lower foreign holdings of the JGBs, its
supply and demand dynamics like the UK
remains fragile, driven by structural
weakness in life insurance demand and
growing share of foreign trading. Hence, we
believe any policy error could lead to an
outsized market reaction that will
ultimately constrain Takaichi's hands.
Brad Rogoff:
I'd buy some of that. Maybe I'll have to ask
one of our UK guys next time we have them on
The Flip Side, if they think they're similar
to Japan. So let me now turn to part of
Takaichi's argument, which is that to
implement her policy deficit funding JGBs
will be used if needed. Once again, that was
very different than what other LDP
candidates said. So she even mentioned
possibly reviewing the government BOJ accord
in her LDP election victory speech, which
all suggests to me at least her Abenomics
style is very well intact.
Shinichiro Kadota:
Sure. But let's look at an example of what
could happen when those market forces can
limit actions and ultimately the outcomes.
So one example is back in July 2016 when Ben
Bernanke, who was writing kind of all about
helicopter money in his blogs, visited then
the PM Prime Minister Abe, which then raised
expectation that Japan might adopt such a
policy. And this has led to 25 basis point
steepening in 1030 JGB curve, 6% yen
depreciation against the dollar in just a
matter of just a week or so. Of course,
Japan did not adopt those policies
eventually. And but Takaichi's Abenomics
leaning comments could lead to such an
expectation speculation and derive
significant near-term market volatility,
which could eventually constrain the ability
to implement such extreme policies, in my
view.
Brad Rogoff:
All right. I talked about the BOJ. You just
brought our friend Mr. Bernanke into the
conversation. So let's talk a little bit
more about central banks here. So one topic
that's come up on this podcast and many
others is the general concept of central
bank independence. Not necessarily with
respect to Japan, but other places including
the US. So on its face, inflation is sticky
enough to keep that conversation alive, but
the Prime Minister is likely to lean against
hikes. So is this a sustainable equilibrium
here?
Shinichiro Kadota:
Sure. Well, Prime Minister Takaichi clearly
has a dovish bias on the BOJ. We believe the
macro and external environment would allow
the BOJ to continue its policy
normalization. First of all, Japan's core
inflation has overshot its target, 2% target
for more than three years now. Second, a
lack of hike could accelerate the yen
depreciation, which has been very unpopular
among the Japanese public as a cause of
inflation, and importantly, US
administration has criticized yen weakness
in the past and called for continued BOJ
policy normalization as recently as
Bessent's comment in the last week. And in
fact, US Treasury reiterated this message
that the sound monetary policy is important
in anchoring inflation expectations and
preventing excess FX volatility.
Brad Rogoff:
Well, now we're getting even more relevant
for global markets here certainly. One thing
I could see is convenient argument that it's
too early to declare a clean exit from
deflation psychology, and that helps appease
the new PM.
Shinichiro Kadota:
Governor with his cautious stance and need for coordination with the new administration, that suggests that a delayed hike compared to what is priced in the market. Our call is that there will be a hike in enero. However, we believe the BOJ's rate hiking cycle isn't dead under Takaichi due to the different macro and diplomatic conditions I mentioned earlier. If yen depreciates more quickly, then the BOJ is likely to respond with even earlier hikes.
Brad Rogoff:
So I alluded to this earlier, right, in terms of the global implications we have from Japan. But one of the biggest ones is that Japan has been a large international bond investor. So at some point, a rise in domestic yields kind of has to spill over to global rates due to their repatriation back to home markets. Right?
Shinichiro Kadota:
Yeah, I agree to an extent, but I believe
the near-term impact will be limited as
Japanese investors have already sold a
significant amount of foreign bonds in 2022,
2023 during the global duration sell off and
rising FX hedging costs for domestic
investors. In the near term, some investors
are even thinking about buying some foreign
bonds again, just given the expectation for
lower FX hedging costs as the Fed continues
to cut its policy rate. However, you're
right in saying that the Japanese investors
will surely keep more funds in domestic
bonds now because now the yields are high
enough to cover their liability costs
instead of having to chase foreign bonds
forward carry. So meaning I think what it
means is the new money will stay more in
Japan. So probably less demand for foreign
bonds in the future for sure.
Brad Rogoff:
But if we're forward looking and the Fed's
cutting and the BOJ is likely to continue
hiking, wouldn't that be positive for the
yen?
Shinichiro Kadota:
So you're correct that the timing rate
differential should drive the dollar yen
lower. However, I think there's a good
argument that the BOJ hike to 1% and the Fed
cutting to 3% are already well priced in the
market. And additionally, Dalian[?] has not
really been driven by rates since 2024 as it
kept rising towards 160 despite stable rate
differentials. And the driver of yen
weakness since 2024 has been global equity
risk premium. So basically, the strong
equity performance has been reducing demand
for safe haven currency like the yen. And
this can cause the yen to weaken further
even from the current level, despite the
consensus forecast of 140.
Brad Rogoff:
Okay. But you're the expert on Japan. But
even I know that this is Japan, and we've
seen FX intervention on currency sell offs
in the past. So if the Ministry of Finance
steps in, do you think that makes prolonged
yen strength more likely?
Shinichiro Kadota:
Innovation can shift levels and break
momentum in the short term, but it rarely
reverses the broad trend. We believe the
fundamental driver of higher dollar yen is
US exceptionalism. Outperformance of the US
economy drives dollar strength, a strong
equity rally that weighs on the yen via safe
haven channel and drives the structural
deficit for Japan. In fact, Japan runs a
deficit of more than 1% of GDP, particularly
against US mega digital companies.
Brad Rogoff:
So we talked a lot about market based and
political constraint, but Takaichi was able
to form a new coalition quickly, and after
the LDP's long standing partner, Komeito
decided to leave her. So wouldn't that put
her in a stronger position to actually
pursue her policy agenda?
Shinichiro Kadota:
So while she quickly recovered ground, to
your point, the new coalition is still short
of commanding a majority in both houses. So,
however, to your point, there's one risk
that can tip the balance towards your
scenario, which is the snap election. So PM
Takaichi's administration's inaugural
approval rating hit 71%, according to
Yomiuri Newspaper, which is the fifth
highest in history. And hence, the PM
Takaichi may decide to call an early snap
election maybe around the end of this year,
maybe around the end of fiscal year perhaps
after passing the budgets. And if LDP wins
strongly in that election, she will have a
much stronger political mandate to pursue
her own policy agenda.
Brad Rogoff:
That would certainly keep Japan at the
forefront of global markets. And we'll be
watching closely as the story continues to
unfold. That's a wrap for episode 77 of The
Flip Side. Thanks for tuning in. Subscribe
wherever you get your podcasts, so you never
miss a debate. Barclays Investment Bank
clients can explore Japan's macro strategy
in depth with our latest reports, including
impact of economic policies on JGB term
premium, and a topic that we didn't even get
to dig into that much, US-Japan investment
deal and market implications now available
on Barclays Live. Until next time, see you
on The Flip Side.
Sobre los expertos
Brad Rogoff
Global Head of Research at Barclays
Shinichiro Kadota
Head of Japan FX and Rates Strategy
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